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A LOOK AT THE GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS ACT
"No man should see how laws or sausages are made."
-Bismarck*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (Act), more formally known
as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,1
represents a significant change in appropriations legislation. With the
Act, Congress has attempted to delegate much of its power to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Government Accounting Office (GAO). Traditionally, whenever Congress changed budget laws, it tried to take power
away from the executive branch.' For the most part, these attempts
were successful, and the executive branch lost much of its budgetary
powers over the years. In contrast, this Act reflects a growing conviction in Congress that the multiple interests present within its two
houses and within the three branches of the government have made the
overall budgetary process very difficult.3
The Act mandates specified annual reductions in the federal deficit" until the deficit is eliminated in fiscal year 1990. 5 The Act is a
radical solution. 6 In short, if Congress and the President cannot come
to an agreement that meets the specifications of the Act, the budgetary
*

Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.).
I. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified in scattered sections of tits. 2, 31, and 42
U.S.C.).
2. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
3. President Reagan noted this problem and praised the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as a
move to impose discipline on the budgetary process. Press Release from Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks of the President at Kickoff Campaign for Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Amendment
(Oct. 4, 1985) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
4. The term "deficit" is defined in the Act as "the amount by which total budget outlays for
such fiscal year exceed total revenues for such fiscal year." 2 U.S.C. § 622(6) (Supp. Il1 1985).
5. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
6. Wehr, Support Grows for Balancing Federal Budget, 43 CONG. Q. 1975, 1975 (Oct. 5,
1985) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
In one sense, the Act is not radical because Congress does delegate power to many agencies
and often creates agencies to manage complex issues. For example, Congress created the Securities Exchange Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Department of Agriculture to handle many such issues. Congress, however, has
never before delegated its'power of the purse. LEGISLATION AND NAT'L SEC. SUBCOMM. OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., STATEMENTS PRESENTED AT THE
HEARING ON "THE BALANCED BUDGET AND EMERGENCY DEFICIT CONTROL ACT OF 1985" 26
(Comm. Print 1985) (statement of Louis Fisher, Government Division, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress).
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process is turned over to the OMB and the CBO, which will then calculate the budget cuts.7 The Act not only attempts to do what Congress
and the President have been unable to do for years, but actually sets
out specific procedures and timetables.'
7. See infra notes 108-79 and accompanying text. When the Act was passed, the GAO was
given a significant role in the new budgetary process; however, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the role of the GAO violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Bowsher v. Synar,
106A S. Ct. 3181 (interim ed. 1986).
8. 2 U.S.C. § 622(7) (Supp. III 1985). The Act provides that the maximum deficit amount
for each fiscal year is as follows:
FY 1986 = $171.9 billion
FY 1987 = $144 billion
FY 1988 = $108 billion
FY 1989 = $72 billion
FY 1990 = $36 billion
FY 1991 = Zero
See id. Section 631 of tit. 2 of the U.S.C. provides the following timetable for the congressional
budgetary process:
On or before:

Action to be completed:

First Monday after January 3

President submits his budget.

February 15 .......................

..

Congressional Budget Office
submits report to Budget
Committees.

February 25 ...........................

Committees submit views and
estimates to Budget
Committees.

April I ...............................

Senate Budget Comm ittee
reports concurrent resolution
on the budget.

April 15 ..............................

Congress completes action on
concurrent resolution on the
budget.

M ay 15 ...............................

Annual appropriation bills may
be considered in the House.

June 10 ...............................

House Appropriations Committee
reports last annual
appropriation bill.

June 15 ....

Congress completes action on
reconciliation legislation.

June 30 ............

House completes action on
annual appropriation bills.

October 1 .............................

Fiscal year begins.

2 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. !11 1985).
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Since the spending cuts are made across the board, the ramifications of the Act are immense.' The spending cuts are taken without
regard to the merits or national importance of a program and are taken
from each program by an equal percentage. 10
This comment is an exposition of the events that led to the enactment of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and subsequent events that
have affected the Act. This comment will discuss the history and policies behind the efforts to reduce the deficit, the legislative history of the
Act, and the operative mechanics of the Act. Finally, the ramifications
of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act will be also discussed.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Budget Process and Deficit Control

In order to understand the impetus behind the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act," it is helpful to review the history of the federal budgetary process. Managing the public debt has always been a concern of
the federal government. Even with 200 years of experience, attempts to
balance the budget have been unsuccessful."2
A public debt has existed since the inception of the United States
government.'3 This original debt was created in large part by the settlement of claims arising from the Revolutionary War. 4 Congressional
attempts to eliminate the national debt have existed since this early
time.'3 Yet, it was not until the increased growth in government and
spending during World War I that Congress initiated its first formal
budgetary process.' 6
9. "Across-the-board cuts" describes cuts mandated through the now defunct automatic
trigger mechanism in which defense and non-defense accounts must each absorb one-half the
amount needed to reduce the deficit. Id. § 902. The automatic trigger mechanism initially raised
significant constitutional and administrative law questions. This part of the Act has been declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Bowsher v. Synar, 106A S. Ct. 3181 (interim ed. 1986).
See infra text accompanying notes 52-107.
10. 2 U.S.C. § 902 (Supp. !11 1985). The Act exempts, limits, and specially treats the
enumerated programs. Id. §§ 905-906.
I1. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037 (codified in scattered sections of tits. 2, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
12. The 1986 fiscal year deficit was projected to reach over $220 billion. 132 CONG. REC.
S157 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1986) (statement of Sen. Baucus); see also Povich, Budget Cuts Will Hit
Many Areas, North Jersey Advance, Jan. 16, 1986, at A8, col. 2.
13. The public debt in 1790 was well over $70 million. L. WHITE, THE FEDERAUSTS 349
(1959).
14. Id. at 348.
15. Stine, Controlling the Budget: An Old Idea, 43 CONG. Q. 2038 (Oct. 12, 1985) (on file
with University of Dayton Law Review) (One of the earliest attempts to actually set a spending
limit to reduce the debt was made by the Commission of the Sinking Fund which authorized the
President to borrow $2 million.).
16. Id. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended
Published by eCommons, 1986
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In the years that followed, however, presidential demands for unprecedented increases in spending multiplied. 17 In reaction to these
presidential demands, and in an effort to reassert its authority, Congress enacted the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.18
Congress made no major changes in the budgetary process until
1972 when former President Nixon's spending cuts directly affected
programs and funds previously approved by Congress.19 In retaliation,
Congress passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 197420 which created the familiar budgetary process that mandated a specific timetable. The Act of 1974 also created the House and
Senate 1 Budget Committees, as well as the Congressional Budget
2
Office.
More recently, there have been various attempts to achieve a balanced budget. For example, in the mid-1970's, a movement supporting
a constitutional amendment to balance the budget gained momentum. 2
at 31 U.S.C. § 703 (1982)), for the first time brought order to the budgetary process. The 1921
Act provided for the formulation of an annual budget by the President and stipulated that the
President submit the budget to Congress as a single measure. Id. § 201. The 1921 Act also created the Government Accounting Office for the purpose of auditing all government expenditures.
Id. § 301.
17. Stine, supra note 15.
18. ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified as amended in scattered sections of tits. 2, 10, 15, 31, 40,
and 44 U.S.C.). The 1946 Act was enacted to give more power to Congress while providing for a
legislative budget system. It also created the Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget to review
the President's budgetary proposals and to report to Congress by February 15 of each year. Id. §
138(a). These attempts, however, proved unsuccessful because the Joint Committee was unable to
estimate accurately appropriate ceilings on expenditures and appropriations so early in the legislative session. Stine, supra note 15. In an attempt to correct these problems, the House Appropriations Committee, in 1950, combined several appropriations bills into one large omnibus bill. 96
CONG. REC. H13,458-503 (1950). This process eventually became too time consuming. Congressional leaders also feared that they would lose too much power in spending decisions. In 1951,
Congress returned to reviewing appropriations bills separately. Stine, supra note 15.
19. Stine, supra note 15. (In an effort to fight inflation, former President Nixon attempted
to circumvent congressional spending by vetoing legislation and by impounding appropriated
funds.). See generally H.R. REP. No. 658, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3462.
20. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified in scattered sections of tits. 2 and 31 U.S.C.)
(The aim of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was to restore
greater control over the budgetary process to Congress.).
21. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974: (I) required Congress to make an annual budget resolution that estimated target spending and debt limits; (2)
created House and Senate budget committees to write budget resolutions; (3) established a detailed timetable for the budgetary process; (4) changed the national fiscal year from July 1 to
June 30 to the period October 1 to September 30; (5) limited presidential impoundment powers
and spending programs not included in the regular budget; (6) created the Congressional Budget
Office to analyze the President's annual budget proposal; and (7) required that all congressional
spending meet the established limit set by Congress. J. PLANO & M. GREENBERG. THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL DICTIONARY 199 (6th ed. 1982).
22. Comment, "The Monster Approaching the Capital:" The Effort to Write Economic
Policy into the UnitedStates Constitution, 15 AKRON L. REv. 733, 733 (1982). S.J. Res. 58, 97th
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/11
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Constitutional amendments, however, are drastic measures which are
procedurally very difficult to attain.2" Later, in 1978, Congress wrote a
balanced-budget requirement into an unrelated bill which mandated
that "the total budget outlays of the Federal Government shall not ex' Again,
ceed its receipts." 24
in another bill introduced in 1980, Congress
"reaffirm[ed] its commitment" to balance the budget.2 5 Despite all of
these efforts, the federal deficit has continued to grow uncontrollably.2
Although the long-standing problem of reducing the deficit and
balancing the budget has been given much thought over the years,
when Congress finally succeeded in 1985 in producing the drastic legislation that might achieve its goal, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
proceeded through both houses of Congress rather quickly and was not
subjected to the traditional legislative processes.
B.

The History of the Gramm-Rudman-HollingsAct

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was first introduced in Congress as Senate Bill 170227 on September 25, 1985, by Senators Phil
Gramm, a Republican from Texas, Warren B. Rudman, a Republican
from New Hampshire, and Ernest F. Hollings, a Democrat from South

Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S9777-78 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1982), was the only proposed
constitutional amendment with a provision requiring a balanced budget to pass either house of
Congress. In the past, constitutional amendments to balance the budget had always failed to reach
a plurality in either house. Note, The Balanced Budget Amendment: An Inquiry into Appropriateness, 96 HARVARD L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1983).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. V. The most recent attempt to require a balanced budget by constitutional amendment proposes to become effective in 1991 after the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act reduces the deficit to zero. Shribmun, New Revenue in Budget Plan Is Gaining Consensus in
Bipartisan Talks in Senate, Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1986, at 7, col. I. Daniel J. Evans, the Republican Senator from Washington, stated that people desired to give the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act a chance to work before passing a constitutional amendment. See also Dewar, Senate Vote
Postponed on Budget Amendment, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1986, at A7, col. 1.
24. Bretton Woods Agreement-Financing Facility, Pub. L. No. 95-435, § 7, 92 Stat. 1051,
1053 (1978) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982)). The balanced-budget requirement
was attached to unrelated legislation involving the International Monetary Fund. The requirement
"was mandatory, but House and Senate conferees sought to soften its effect by specifying that it
'may be superseded by the actions of future Congresses.' " Stein, supra note 15 (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1613, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in part in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2592) (The balanced budget requirement, therefore, amounted to nothing more than a
mere gesture by Congress to balance the budget.).
25. Bretton Woods Agreement Act, amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-389, § 3, 94 Stat. 1551,
1553 (1980) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982)); see also Stine, supra note 15.
Later, this same commitment to balance the budget was reaffirmed. Money and Finance Act, Pub.
L. No. 97-258, § 1103, 96 Stat. 877, 908 (1982) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982)).
26. "The federal debt, which represents years of accumulated deficit spending, has more
than doubled in the last five years." Wehr, Senate Passes Plan to Balance Federal Budget, 43
CONG. Q. 2035, 2035 (Oct. 12, 1985) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
27. S. 1702, 99th Cong., IstSess., 131 CONG. REC. S12,085 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1985).
Published
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Carolina.2 8 The bill's legislative history is unique because of the unorthodox legislative procedures followed.2 9 The bill "was not subjected to
committee hearings, economic and other analysis, or to the preliminary
revisions of committees with expertise." 30 The bill was subjected only
to minimal debate and amendments." Then, on'October 3, 1985, the
sponsors of the bill offered S. 1702 as an amendment to House Joint
Resolution 37232 which proposed to raise the statutory limit of the public debt. The amendment of S. 1702 to H.R.J. Res. 37211 was a strategic move that drew upon the momentum of the House Joint Resolution.3 4 Since increased federal spending approached the previous
statutory debt limit, H.R.J. Res. 372 was almost assured of passage.3 5
If H.R.J. Res. 372 had not passed, then the federal government would
38
have lacked authority to borrow funds to meet the country's expenses.
On October 10, 1985, the Senate passed the combined legislation3"
and the House, on October 11, 1985, decided to go directly to confer-

28. Id.; Wehr, supra note 26.
29. See Wehr, Congress Enacts Far-ReachingBudget Measure, 43 CONG. Q. 2604, 2606
(Dec. 14, 1985) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
30. Wehr, supra note 26.
31. Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 85-3945) (on file with University of Dayton
Law Review). The bill was amended after it was first introduced, but these changes were made in
"private session." Wehr, supra note 26. "The Gramm-Rudman document was never debated
before the Senate voted on it; no Senator had an opportunity whatsoever except Mr. Gramm, Mr.
Rudman and Mr. Hollings to even look at it; and . . . [the House] has never had it debated,
because it was shoved down our throats by . . .[the Senate]." 131 CONG. REC. HI 1,959 (daily
ed. Dec. 12, 1985).
32. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985: Hearings on H.R.J.
Res. 372 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on
Government Operations. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Balanced Budget].
33. 131 CONG. REC. S12,561 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1985). H.R.J. Res. 372 as enacted raised the
statutory limit of the public debt from $1,823,800,000,000 to $2,078,700,000,000. 31 U.S.C. §
3101(b)(1982 & Supp. II 1985). The amendment that combined the two bills was passed in the
Senate by a vote of 75-24 on October 9, 1985. 131 CONG. REC. S12,988 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1985).
See also 21 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Legislation, WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1190 (Oct. 7, 1985).
.Frustrated at Leadership,
34. Calmes, Senate's Initiative Leaves Democrats ......
Republicans, 43 CONG. Q. 2036, 2036 (Oct. 12, 1985) (on file with University of Dayton Law
Review). The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act gained support quickly after its introduction in September 1985. Wehr, supra note 6.
35. The previous statutory debt limit, Public Debt Limit, Extension, Pub. L. No. 98-475, 98
Stat. 2206 (1984) (amended 1986), was enacted on October 13, 1984. S. REP. No. 144, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 979, 981.
36. Calmes, supra note 34. "The Treasury Department told the Committee on Finance during its public hearing that the increases in the public debt limit will be necessary by September
S. REP. No.
30, 1985, if the Treasury Department is to carry out its statutory obligations .
144, supra note 35.
37. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 51-37. 131 CONG. REc. S13,114 (daily ed. Oct.
10, 1985).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/11
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ence with the.Senate.3 8 On November 1, 1985, the House approved a
revised version of the bill.3 9 The Senate then approved a further
amended version of H.R.J. Res. 372.40 Again the bill was sent to conference where the many differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill were eliminated. A final version of H.R.J. Res. 372
emerged from the conference as House Report 99-433. 1 Finally, on
December 11, 1985, both the Senate 4 and the House 43 passed this final
revision of the bill. President Reagan signed the bill into law on December 12, 1985. 4 Although the President expressed his support for
the deficit reduction plan, he also commented on the constitutional issues raised by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.45 While signing the
bill, the President stated, "I am in no sense dismissing the constitutional problems or acquiescing in a violation of the system of separated
powers carefully crafted by the framers of the Constitution."'46
Representative Mike Synar, a Democrat from Oklahoma, led the
attack on the Act, raising the delegation and separation of power issues.' 7 On the day the bill became law, Representative Synar filed suit

38. 131 CONG. REC. H8716 (daily ed. Oct. I1,1985). Hearings were then held on the bill
while it was before the House. Balanced Budget, supra note 32. See generally Wehr, Difficult
Questions Unresolved in Budget Measure Conference, 43 CONG. Q. 2147 (Oct. 26, 1985) (on file
with University of Dayton Law Review). Wehr, House OKs Democrats' Budget-Balancing Plan,
43 CONG. Q. 2191 (Nov. 2, 1985) [hereinafter House] (on file with University of Dayton Law
Review).
A conference is "[a] meeting between the representatives of the House and the Senate to
reconcile differences between the two houses ...." 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at xv (1984). Minutes of the committee meetings are kept secret, and once an agreement among the committee
members is reached, the measure must again be brought before both chambers of Congress. J.
PLANO & M. GREENBERG, supra note 21, at 166. This agreement, called a conference report,
cannot be amended on the floor, and frequently the measure must go back to conference for
renegotiation. Id.
39. 131 CONG. REC. H9614-15 (daily ed. Nov. i, 1985); see also House, supra note 38, at
2191-93.
40. 131 CONG. REC. S14,924 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985); see also House, supra note 38, at
2191-93.
41. H.R. REP.No. 433, 99th Cong., IstSess., reprinted in part in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 988. See generally Wehr, Conferees near Agreement on Budget Measure, 43
CONG. Q. 2410, 2410 (Nov. 23, 1985) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
42. The Senate passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act by a vote of 61-31. 131 CONG.
REC. S17,443-44 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985).
43. The House passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act by a vote of 271-154 with 9 abstentions. 131 CONG. REc. H 11,903-04 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1985).
44. Balanced Budget Legislation, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1490, 1491 (Dec. 16,
1985).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Representative Synar raised these issues during hearings on the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. Balanced Budget, supra note 32, at 58-63, 101-02, 219-29 & 231. See Wehr, Synar
Sues to Block Automatic Cuts, 43 CONG. Q. 2607, 2607 (Dec. 14, 1985) (on file with University
Published
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in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 8 A subsequent ac4
tion was filed by the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU).
The suits filed by Representative Synar and the NTEU were later consolidated.50 On January 10, 1986, a three-judge panel in the District
Court for the District of Columbia heard oral argument on the

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.51
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Battle in the Courts

Interestingly, the United States, the defendant, agreed with the
plaintiffs, the Congressmen, on a key issue. Both plaintiffs and defendant agreed, within the context of the Act, that the role of the Government Accounting Office violated the constitutionally based separation
of powers doctrine.5 2 In its brief, the defendant noted that it was reluc-

1986 spending cuts will be in effect and any number of parties will have standing. At the time
Representative Synar filed his suit, there was a question whether he had the proper standing to
sue; however, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) soon filed and at least one party
did have standing. The United States Supreme Court found that Representative Synar had standing. Bowsher v. Synar, 106A S. Ct. 3181, 3186 (interim ed. 1986) (citing Barnes v. Kline, 759
Burke v. Barnes, 106A S. Ct. 1258 (interim
F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub noma.
ed. 1986)).
48. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar,
106A S. Ct. 3181, 3186 (interim ed. 1986). The Congressmen who joined Representative Synar in
the suit were Representatives Gary L. Ackerman, Albert G. Bustamante, Silvio 0. Conte, Don
Edwards, Vic Fazio, Robert Garcia, John J. LaFalce, Jim Moody, Claude D. Pepper, Robert G.
Torricelli, and James A. Traficant, Jr. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1, Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 85-3945) (on file with University of Dayton
Law Review). Each of these Representatives voted against the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.
131 CONG. REC. H11903 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985).
49. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, No. 85-4106 (D.D.C. filed Jan.
8, 1986).
50. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1374.
The three-judge panel was composed of judges Antonin Scalia, Oliver Gasch, and
51.
Norma Holloway Johnson. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1377. Wehr, Fallout of Anti-Deficit Law Begins to Settle, 43 CONG. Q. 51, 52 (Jan. 11, 1986) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review). See generally Kamen, New Budget Law Called an Abdication of Power, Wash. Post, Jan.
11, 1986, at A6, col. 1; Pear, Court Hears Impassioned Debate over Legality of New Budget Law,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1986, at 8, col. I.
52. Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Response by the
United States to Motions Filed by the Various Other Parties at 25-54, Synar v. United States,
626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 85-3945) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
See also Memorandum, supra note 31, at 37-44. Before National Treasury and Synar were consolidated, the United States Senate, Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the United
States House of Representatives, and Comptroller General of the United States intervened in both
cases as defendants. The intervenor-defendants argued that there was no violation of separation of
powers. See Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1379.
The Constitution established three branches of government with separate and defined powers.
The purpose of these separate powers was to prevent one branch from encroaching upon the other.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/11
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tant to challenge the constitutionality of any statute, but that its analysis of the issues led to the conclusion that the Act did indeed violate the
separation of powers doctrine. 3
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act vested enormous budgetary
powers in the Comptroller General of the GAO. The Act mandated
that the President must abide by the report from the GAO. Plaintiffs
alleged that because the Comptroller General has "sufficient Legislative powers that he must be considered part of that Branch."' Therefore, the Act usurped presidential executive powers. 55 This would constitute an attempt by the legislature to participate in both the
administration of laws (an executive function) and the creation of laws
(a legislative function) and would violate separation of powers
principles."
The defendant, in agreement with the plaintiffs, alleged that the
Comptroller General was part of the legislative branch. 7 Consequently,
Congress could not attempt to execute the laws by delegating enforcement powers to a member of its own branch. 58 This execution of its
own laws would enlarge the powers of the legislative branch in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine.5 1 In addition, the defendant alleged that the Comptroller General's duties were clearly executive in nature. 60 Thus, the Comptroller General had no authority, as a
legislative officer, to oversee the execution of laws. 61 The defendant
used legislative history and the fact that Congress retained the power
to remove the Comptroller General from office as evidence to bolster its
62
argument.
In addition to the separation of powers argument, the plaintiffs
argued that the Act improperly delegated legislative authority in violaadopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of
arbitrary power." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
53. Memorandum, supra note 52, at 26.
54. Memorandum, supra note 31, at 38.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.

57. Id. at 27.
58. Id. at 29.
59. Id. at 30.
60. Id. The defendant noted that "the Comptroller General undertakes an independent
analysis and is free to reach conclusions different from those of OMB and CBO." Id. at 30-31.
"[T]he Comptroller General's task is crucial because his economic forecasts have an enormous
impact on budget planning and predicting a deficit, as well as its size." Id. at 31-32. "[Tlhere can
be no doubt that . . . the Comptroller General is here charged with executing the law. He is
clearly acting as an administrative officer charged with making expert judgments in carrying out
the will of Congress." Id. at 32.
61. Id. at 33.
Published62.
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tion of constitutional standards.6 s Although the plaintiffs recognized
that not all statutes delegating lawmaking powers are improper, the
plaintiffs questioned whether the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act delegated too much power to the wrong person." Plaintiffs first argued that
the standards specified in the Act were vague and therefore constituted
an improper delegation. 65 These standards, according to plaintiffs, were
66
based solely upon assumptions, not statistical authority. The plaintiffs
further argued that because these assumptions might change, the re6
ductions could not accurately reflect the intent of Congress. " Thus, the
68
plaintiffs alleged that Act was practically standardless.
Second, the plaintiffs challenged the type of authority that was
delegated. According to the plaintiffs, some functions are "so central to
69
the legislative function that they may not be delegated." Plaintiffs
' 70 of Congress,
argued that the power of the purse is a "core function
legislature.71
because it is a duty constitutionally imposed upon the
72
Third, plaintiffs challenged the necessity of the Act. Since Congress had not claimed that balancing the budget is a more complex or
difficult task than any other type of legislation, there was no need to
delegate budgetary authority."3 Thus, since Congress had successfully
managed other types of complex and technical legislation, Congress
could balance the budget.
The defendant, on the other hand, contended that the Act did not

63. Id. at 16-36. Delegation is one of Congress' oldest tools. Congress has delegated authority to the other branches since 1789. Initially, Congress delegated the power "to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, provided such rules
are not repugnant to the laws of the United States." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17(b), I
Stat. 73, 83. During the last fifty years, however, Congress has attempted to delegate increased
power to the President and administrative agencies. INS v. Chadha: The Future Demise of Legislative Delegation and the Need for a ConstitutionalAmendment, II J. LEGIs. 317, 317 (1984).
64. Memorandum, supra note 31, at 16-19.
65. Id. at 19, 26-27.
66. Id. at 23-24. The assumptions underlying the budget cuts are in budget base levels of
total revenues, budget outlays for the fiscal year, projected deficit, and rate of real economic
growth. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 251, 2 U.S.C. § 901
(Supp. 1111985).
67. Memorandum, supra note 31, at 23-24.
68. Id. at 26-27 ("[T]here is absolutely nothing in the Act that prevents the Directors from
assuming virtually, if not actually, anything they want regarding the operation of this law
69. Id. at 20.
70. Id. at 21.
71. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
I..."
at 20-21 (citing U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7).
Id.
made by Law .
plaintiffs, in essence, were attacking Congress' power as stipulated in
The
at
27-31.
Id.
72.
the necessary and proper clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
73. Memorandum, supra note 31, at 29 (Plaintiffs argued that this was an example of Conhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/11
gress trying to avoid a fundamental choice.).
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violate the delegation doctrine.74 First, defendant disagreed that the
Act was sweeping and standardless." The defendant argued that the
Comptroller General had no real role in making legislative policy decisions. 76 Rather, the policy decisions were made by Congress when it
passed the Act, and the "detailed statutory guidelines" within the Act
were sufficient standards to guide the actions of the Comptroller
77
General.
The defendant relied upon The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v.
United Statess7 8 and noted that "[like President Madison . . . the
Comptroller General, will not be usurping any legislative power when
they perform their duties under the Act."7 9 Instead, the Comptroller
General will be following the mandate of Congress as set forth in the
Act.8 0 The defendant also pointed out that the duties assigned to the
Comptroller General could be clearly distinguished from the only two
cases which the United States Supreme Court struck down on the basis
of the delegation doctrine.8 1
The District Court for the District of Columbia rendered its decision on February 7, 1986,2 and found that the automatic spending
mechanism was unconstitutional. 83 The court held:
[S]ince the powers conferred upon the Comptroller General as part of
the automatic deficit reduction process are executive powers, which cannot constitutionally be exercised by an officer removable by Congress,
those powers cannot be exercised and therefore the automatic deficit reduction process to which they are central cannot be implemented."

74. Memorandum, supra note 52, at 15-25.
75. Memorandum, supra note 31, at 16.
76. Id. at 17.
77. Id.
78. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). In Brig Aurora, an Act of Congress gave the President
the authority to declare when France and England had violated neutral commerce. This declaration by the President had the power of reviving an expired Act and the sanctions contained
therein. The litigant claimed that "Congress could not transfer the legislative power to the President." Id. at 386. The Court stated that "we can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature
should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of March Ist, 1809, either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct." Id. at 388.
79. Memorandum, supra note 31, at 19.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 22. The defendant pointed out that in both Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935), and A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the
National Recovery Act attempted to delegate power which would have made crimes of acts which
were not crimes before. Id.
82. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1374.
83. Id. at 1377. The unsigned decision is believed to have been written by Judge Antonin
Scalia. Section of Gramm-Rudman Breaches Separation of Powers, High Court Says, Dayton
Daily News, July 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
Synar, 626 F. 1986
Supp. at 1403.
Published84.
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The district court, as expected, did not find that the Act authorized an
improper delegation of power. Throughout history, the delegation doc5
trine has been narrowly interpreted to uphold legislative delegations.
The district court specifically noted that it was not necessary to discuss
the issue of delegation since it had found section 252 of the Act uncon86
stitutional based upon a violation of separation of powers principles.
The court reasoned, however, that it would provide its views obiter
unnecessary delay and to avoid a remand by the Sudicta to prevent
87
Court.
preme
The district court found that the delegation doctrine remained
that the delegation doctrine was "dead, or at least
valid despite8 claims
'moribund'." 8 In addition, the court found that the powers delegated
by Congress to the Comptroller General were not of the type which
' 89
The district court reasoned that any
constitute a "core function."

90 and
adoption of the core function analysis would be 'standardless'
based upon "the court's own perceptions of the relative importance of
the various legislative functions." 91
The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdic9
tion 2 and heard oral argument following expedited review as specified
in the Act.98 The news media announced the Supreme Court's decision
on June 15, 1986. 9 " It was reported that the Court invalidated the au95
tomatic trigger mechanism by a vote of 7-2. However, no formal an-

85.

Id. at 1383.
86. Id. at 1382-83.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1384 (citing National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 353
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). The United States Supreme Court invalidated a delegation of
power claim only two times in the past fifty years. The Fourth Branch: Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REV. 619, 619. First, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935) and later, in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935),
the Court concluded that extremely broad delegations of power were unconstitutional. In these
cases, the Court ruled that the delegation was not accompanied by adequate standards, thus giving too much power to the respective agencies.
89. Synar. 626 F. Supp. at 1385.
90. Id.
91. Id. ("No constitutional provision distinguishes between 'core' and 'non-core' legislative
functions. . . .Finally, if there were any nondelegable 'core functions,' there is no reason to believe that appropriations functions would be among them.").
92. Bowsher v. Synar, 106A S. Ct. 3181, 3186 (interim d. 1986).
93. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 274, 2 U.S.C. § 922
(Supp. il 1985).
94. Gramm-Rudman Big News Is No News, Newsday, June 17, 1986, at 15, col. 2.
95. Id. ABC news also reported that the decision would be written by Chief Justice Burger
and that an important concurring opinion would be written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
Taylor, High Court Voids Major Step in Law that Cuts Deficit, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1986, at
A17, col. 4. There was, however, no separate concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor. See generhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/11
ally Bowsher, 106A S. Ct. at 3181.
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nouncement followed. The initial report was based upon a news leak,
and only after twenty-two days passed, did the Supreme Court formally announce its decision.9 6
The Supreme Court's decision affirmed the district court's opinion.
The Supreme Court, however, underscored the importance of the doctrine of separation of powers by citing to Montesquieu and James
Madison, and to such landmark decisions as Myers v. United States,'97
98
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube
99
Co. v. Sawyer,
Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,10 0 and Buckley v. Valeo.' 0°
The Supreme Court invalidated the automatic trigger mechanism
because Congress granted executive powers to an agency within its own
branch. The Court noted that the GAO is a legislative agency. 10 2 The
Court explained that the critical factor in its decision was the removability of the Comptroller General by Congress.10 3 Although the Comptroller General is nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, he is removable only by Congress, either through impeachment
proceedings or by joint resolution. 0 4 Thus, although the Comptroller
General performs his duties independently, Congress, in fact, would be
given a congressional veto because Congress would be able to control
the execution of the laws which it creates. 0 5

In addition to these attacks in the courtroom, the Gramm-Rud-

man-Hollings Act also has been the subject of attack in the legislature.
Not only have Congressmen proposed amendments to the Act, 0 6 but

96. The decision was announced by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger on his last day as
presiding Chief Justice. The Mandate Remains, Columbus Dispatch, July 9, 1986, at 10A, col. 1.
97. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (the Court recognized that the power to remove an executive officer
is an incident to the power to appoint that executive officer).
98. 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (the Court recognized that the President's removal powers were
not unlimited).
99. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the Court struck down an Executive Order of the President because the power sought to be exercised was a lawmaking power not an executory power).
100. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (the Court held that use of the legislative veto by Congress was
unconstitutional).
101. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (the Court held that the constitutional power to appoint officers of
the United States is vested in the President per article II of the Constitution).
102. Bowsher, 106A S. Ct. at 3181. "It is clear that Congress has consistently viewed the
Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch." Id. "Over the years, the Comptrollers General have also viewed themselves as part of the Legislative Branch." Id.
103. Id. at 3189.
104. Id. Congress may remove the Comptroller General by joint resolution based upon a
permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, a felony, or conduct involving
moral turpitude. Id.
105. Bowsher, 106A S. Ct. at 3189. The congressional veto was found unconstitutional in
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
106. For example, Representative Hutto, a Democrat from Florida, proposed an amendment which,
if passed, would
Published
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they have also led efforts to repeal the Act. The various challenges to
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act object to the operative mechanics of
the Act. In particular, the challenges attack the various ways in which
the Act changes the traditional roles of the President and Congress in
the budgetary process.

B.

The Mechanics of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act

08
The purpose of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act' is to eliminate the federal deficit and to achieve a balanced budget by fiscal year
1991.109 This goal will be achieved by limiting the allowable deficit in
0
each of the next five fiscal years." The Act amends the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974111 to ensure that the
maximum deficit amounts are reached. These amendments require
across-the-board cuts from non-exempt programs, by a uniform percentage, to achieve deficit targets."' The Act will be triggered, however, only if the traditional budget process fails to reach the deficit
spending cuts equally betargets. The Act also divides these automatic
13
accounts.
non-defense
tween defense and
The Act itself is divided into five sections. Part A enumerates
changes in the new congressional budget process and is further divided
into four subparts. 14 Part B explains the new requirements for submission of the President's budget and mandates that the President's budget
115
Part C specifies the emernot exceed the maximum deficit amount.

ing to lower pay categories." 132 CONG. REC. HII (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1986).
107. See, e.g.. 132 CONG. REc. ElI (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1986); 132 CONG. REC. H5 (daily
ed. Jan. 21, 1986) (Representative Ted Weiss, a Democrat from New York, predicted "devastation" to the American public from the budget cuts.); 132 CONG. REC. H5 (daily ed. Jan. 21,
1986) (Representative Ted Weiss referred to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as a "mindless
system".).
108. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1037, 1039 (codified in scattered sections of tits. 2, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
109. 131 CONG. REC. S17,381-82 (daily ed. Dec. 11,1985) (statement of Sen. Packwood).
The deficit will be reduced by $36 billion annually starting with fiscal year 1987 until the deficit is
reduced to zero in fiscal year 1990. Id. at S17,382.
110. Id. at S17,381-82.
Ill. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified in scattered sections of tits. 2 and 31
U.S.C.).
112. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 251(a)(3), 2 U.S.C. §
901(a)(3) (Supp. Ill1985). For a list of the exceptions, limitations, and special rules for certain
programs, see infra note 154 and accompanying text.
113. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 251(a)(2)(B), 2
U.S.C. § 901(a)(2)(B) (Supp. Ill1985).
114. Id. §§ 201, 211-214, 221-228, 231-232, 2 U.S.C. §§ 602, 622, 651-656. The four
subparts are: I-Congressional Budget; II-Amendments to Title IV of the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974; Ill-Additional Provisions to Improve Budget Procedures; and IV-Technical and
Conforming Amendments.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/11
115. Id.§§ 241-242, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105(a)-I106(b).
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gency powers which eliminate deficits in excess of the maximum deficit
amount.1 1 Part D is limited to budgetary treatment of social security
trust funds, 1 7 and Part E deals with miscellaneous and related

provisions."

8

Part A is important because it effects significant changes in the
budgetary process as it existed under the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.19 Part A not only enumerates
maximum deficit amounts, 20 but it also formulates new accelerated
budget timetables for the congressional budgetary process. 2 ' The purpose of these amendments to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is to "prevent congressional foot-dragging"
in the budgetary process and to "prevent floor action on legislation
[that would exceed] deficit targets.' 22
Part B requires the President "[o]n or before the first Monday
after January 3 of each year"' 23 to submit an annual budget to Congress which does not exceed the maximum deficit amount for the given
fiscal year. 2 4 This section forces the President to make spending cuts
which he might not have otherwise made. For example, if President
Reagan wishes to continue his policy of increased military spending,
other programs will have to be cut deeply in order to meet the GrammRudman-Hollings maximum deficit amounts.
116. Id. §§ 251-257, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-902. For an enumeration of the maximum deficit
amounts, see supra note 8.
117. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 261, 42 U.S.C. § 911,
911 note (Supp. I11 1985).
118. Id. §§ 271-275, 2 U.S.C. §§ 621 note to 901 note, 921-922.
119. See Wehr, supra note 29, at 2609. "The least-examined aspect of the legislation is its
many important changes in congressional budget rules .
I..."
ld. at 2607. Under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President submitted his budget request
at the end of January and the CBO reported to the budget committees in the House and Senate
on fiscal policy and budget priorities by April 1. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974, § 300, 88 Stat. 297, 306 (The congressional budget process timetable is currently
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 631.). By March 15, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 required committees to submit reports and estimates to their respective budget committees. Id. The budget committees reported the budget resolution to the floor by April 15. Id.
Then Congress was required to complete floor action on the first budget resolution by May 15 and
on the final, binding resolution by September 15. Id. A reconciliation bill was required by September 25 so that the budget could be effective on October I, the beginning of the new fiscal year. Id.
120. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 201(a)(7), 2 U.S.C. §
622(7).
121. Id. § 201(b), 2 U.S.C. § 631. See also supra note 8.
122. Wehr, supra note 29, at 2608. "Most of these procedural changes were lifted wholesale
from recommendations developed over several years by a House group chaired by Rep. Anthony
C. Beilenson, D-Calif." Id. at 2607-08.
123. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 241(a), 31 U.S.C. §
1105(a) (Supp. I11 1985).
124. Id. § 241(b), 31 U.S.C. § 1105(f)(1). For an enumeration of the maximum deficit
Published
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Part C, now partly invalidated by the Supreme Court, " is perhaps the most unusual and certainly the most controversial section of
the Act. It is more commonly referred to as the automatic trigger
mechanism. Spending cuts were to be triggered by the mechanism only
if the budgetary process, as amended in Parts A and B of the Act,
2
failed to reach the maximum deficit amount for the given fiscal year.
The rationale behind the automatic trigger mechanism was that since
Congress and the President were unable to agree on cuts that would
forced to create a mechanism
reduce the rising deficit, Congress was
2
that would make the cuts for them.1 7
Some have characterized the automatic spending cut mechanism
as a scare tactic, whose purpose was to force the President and Con28
gress into making some difficult budgetary decisions.' Actually, the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act gives the traditional budgetary process
an opportunity to work on its own to achieve the maximum deficit allowable. If these levels are not reached, then the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings automatic trigger mechanism would make across-the-board cuts
to effect the reductions which Congress and the President could not
make.
Part C of the Act still requires the Director of the OMB and the
Director of the CBO to estimate the projected deficit and report the
excess deficit. 129 The Directors must (1) estimate the base levels of total revenues and budget outlays, (2) determine whether the projected
deficit would exceed the maximum deficit amount, and (3) estimate
economic growth.13 0 Then, on August 20, the Directors were instructed
to make a joint report of their findings to the Comptroller General of
the GAO.1 3 ' The Act mandates that the joint report both project and
determine whether the estimated deficit exceeds the maximum deficit

Bowsher, 106A S. Ct. at 3191-92.
131 CONG. REC. S17,381-82 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985) (statement of Sen. Packwood,
1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 979, 1049).
127. "[Nleither the Congress nor the President can agree on doing the very difficult specific
things necessary to get that deficit way down to or toward zero. . . . [We are now in the process
of seeing an attempt . . . to eliminate the deficit, while the Congress and to some extent the
President avoid most of the specific decisions needed to do so. It's kind of a 'Look, ma, no hands'
approach .... ." Working Toward a Balanced Budget: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Budget, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) (statement of Charles L. Schultze, Resident Fellow,
Brookings Institution). Contra Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1391 ("It seems to us not true . . . that
Congress has declined to make the 'hard political choices.' ").
128. "[Tlhe Hill and the White House seem locked in a long and drawn-out game of
chicken." Thomas, Gramm-Rudman Game of Chicken, TIME, Feb. 10, 1986, at 48, col. 1.
129. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 251(a)(1)-(2), 2
U.S.C. § 901(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 111 1985).
130. Id. § 251(a)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(l).
131. Id. § 251(a)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2). For fiscal year 1986, the joint report was filed
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/11
on January 15, 1986. Notice, 51 Fed. Reg. 1917, 1917-41 (1986).
125.
126.
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amount by ten billion dollars.' 3 2 If the maximum deficit amount is exceeded, then the joint report must specify "by account, for non-defense
programs, and by account and programs, projects and activities within
each account, for defense programs, the base from which reductions
are taken and the amounts and percentages by which such accounts
must be reduced during such fiscal year . . . in order to eliminate such
133
excess."'
The method to determine exactly how much is to be cut from each
program is established in the Act. 13 4 The amount of the deficit in excess of the maximum deficit amount is divided in half.136 One-half of
the excess is cut from non-defense programs and the other half is cut
from defense programs. 136
After receiving the OMB-CBO joint report, the Comptroller General was required to "review and consider the report issued by the Directors . . . with due regard for the data, assumptions, and methodologies used in reaching the [projections]."' 3 7 The Comptroller General
was then instructed to issue his own report to the President and Congress.' 8 The Act specified that the report by the GAO must be based
on the estimates of the Directors of the OMB and CBO 3 9 and must
"explain fully any differences between the contents of its
report and the
report of the Directors.' 4 0 In addition, the OMB and CBO were obligated to submit a revised joint report to the Comptroller General on
October 5, so that the Comptroller General could submit a revised report to the President by October 10.141
The next step in the automatic spending cut mechanism required
the President, on September 1, to issue an initial presidential order

132. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 251(a)(2), 2 U.S.C. §
901(a)(2) (Supp. II!1985). The $10 billion trigger figure is inapplicable in fiscal years 1986 and
1991. This figure ensures a zero deficit by fiscal year 1991.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 251(a)(3), 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(3).
135. Id. § 251(a)(3)(A), 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(3)(A).
136. Id. § 251(a)(3)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(3)(B).
137. Id. § 251(b)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1). The GAO report must be issued on August 25
of each calendar year. For fiscal year 1986, the GAO report was issued on January 20, 1986.
Notice, 51 Fed. Reg. 2811, 2811-70 (1986).
138. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 251(b)(1), 2 U.S.C. §
901(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 251(b)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2).
141. The OMB and the CBO must submit their revised report to the Comptroller General
and must base the report on how subsequently enacted laws and regulations have affected their
initial report. Id. § 251(c), 2 U.S.C. § 901(c). The Comptroller General must base his revised
report on any changes in the Directors' reports and submit the revised report to Congress and the
Published
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that estimated the deficit excess.1 42 The initial presidential order was to
be based upon the Comptroller General's report.1 43 The Act specified
that the President could "not modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determinations, specifications, bases, amounts or percentages set
forth in the report.' 44 In addition, the presidential order was to be
5
accompanied by a message transmitted to both houses of Congress. ,
The purpose of the message was to explain the exact amount by which
each project and activity within each account would be reduced or
sequestered. 4 6
As soon as Congress received the initial order from the President,
they were to refer the proposals to the respective committees with jurisdiction over the programs affected." 7 Congress then had one month to
48 Any
avoid these cuts by passing alternative spending cut legislation.
changes made by Congress in the fiscal laws were to be reported in the
OMB-CBO revised report and subsequently, in the GAO revised report. 4 9 Moreover, these changes were to be reflected in the issuance of
the President's final order. 50 Part C also gave the Senate an opportu5
nity to submit alternatives to the final presidential order.' 1 Moreover,

142. Id. ] 252](a)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1). The order must modify or suspend the operation of federal laws that would require spending increases contrary to the purpose of the Act. It
must also eliminate the remainder of the deficit excess over the maximum deficit amount by sequestering new budget authority to reduce spending in accordance with the Comptroller General's
report. Id. § 252(a)(l)(A)-(B), 2 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1)(A)-(B). For fiscal year 1986, President
Reagan issued the order on February 1, 1986. Emergency Deficit Control Measures for Fiscal
Year 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 4291, 4291-92 (1986).
143. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 252(a)(3), 2 U.S.C. §
902(a)(3) (Supp. II11985).
144. Id. In fiscal year 1986, the President did have some authority to make determinations
that differed from the Comptroller General's report; however, these were with respect to defense
programs only. Id. § 252(a)(2), 2 U.S.C. 902(a)(2); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 433, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 82, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 988, 999-1000.

145.

Id. § 252(a)(5), 2 U.S.C. § 902(a)(5).

146. Id. The President may also include any other details which he deems necessary or
appropriate. The President may also recommend "alternative ways to reduce the deficit ..... Id.
§ 252(c), 2 U.S.C. § 902(c).

147.

Id. § 252(a)(5), 2 U.S.C. § 902(a)(5).

148. The one-month period is the time between the issuance of the initial order, September
I, id. at § 252(a)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1), and the effective date of the initial order, October 1.
Id. § 252(a)(6)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 902(a)(6)(B). This period has often been referred to as the
"window."
149. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
150. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 252(b), 2 U.S.C. §
902(b) (Supp. III 1985). The President's final order must be issued by October 15 and is effective
upon the date of issuance. Id. § 252(b)(1), 2 U.S.C. § 902(b)(1). To ensure that the final order
complies with all specifications of the Act, the Comptroller General on or before November 15
must certify whether the order "fully and accurately complies with such requirements." Id. § 253,
2 U.S.C. § 903.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/11
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Id. § 254(b), 2 U.S.C. § 904(b).
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the Act provided an accelerated process by which this legislation could
move through the legislature. 15 2 Part C also contains provisions that
enumerate special procedures to be followed in the event of a recession. " Lastly, Part C exempts and limits operation of the Act on cer-

tain programs.154

The next major subdivision, Part D, deals solely with the budgetary treatment of social security trust funds. 155 This part specifies that
the trust fund "shall not be included in the totals of the budget of the
United States . . . and shall be exempt from any general budget limitation imposed by statute."' 5 Part D also prohibits any transfer of
trust funds to the general treasury and any transfer of funds from the
general treasury to the social security trust fund. 57
The last section of the Act, Part E,158 deals with miscellaneous
and related provisions. One of the more interesting sections of the Act
is the subsection which deals with judicial review.' 51 This section first
provides for expedited review in the United States District Court of the
District of Columbia for any action brought challenging the validity of
the Act.' 60 It also permits an appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court. 61 The Act places a duty on both courts to "advance on
the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition
of any matter brought."' 62 The decision rendered by the District Court
for the District of Columbia, however, is stayed until final disposition
of the suit. 16 3

152. Id. § 254(b)-(c), 2 U.S.C. § 904(b)-(c).
153. Id. § 254(a), 2 U.S.C. § 904(a).
154. Id. §§ 255-256, 2 U.S.C. §§ 905-906. For example, social security, tier I railroad
retirement benefits, veterans programs, net interest, earned income tax credits, offsetting receipts
and collections, certain program bases, specified prior and legal obligations, and certain low income programs are exempt. Id. Limitations and special rules are placed on guaranteed student
loans, Medicare, child support enforcement, foster care and adoption assistance, unemployment
compensation, and the Commodity Credit Corporation. Id. See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 433,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 85-94, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 979,

1002-12.
155. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 261, 42 U.S.C. § 911
(Supp. Ii 1985).

156. Id. § 261(a)(l)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 911(a)(1)(E).
157. Id. § 261(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 911(b)(2).
158. Id. §§ 271-275, 2 U.S.C. §§ 621 note to 901 note (Part E encompasses waivers and
suspensions, rulemaking powers, restoration of trust fund investments, revenue estimates, judicial
review, and effective dates.).
159. Id. § 274, 2 U.S.C. § 922.
160. The authors of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act seem to have anticipated a constitutional challenge. This section permits members of Congress and other persons to bring suit for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Id. § 274(a), 2 U.S.C. § 922(a).
161. Id. § 274(b), 2 U.S.C. § 922(b).
162. Id. § 274(c), 2 U.S.C. § 922(c).
Id. § 274(e), 2 U.S.C. § 922(e). The decision of the United States District Court for
Published 163.
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Part E, anticipating the legal challenges to the automatic trigger
164
This alternative
mechanism, also provides an alternative procedure.
16
procedure is more commonly referred to as the "fallback" provision.
The failback provision establishes a Temporary Joint Committee on
Deficit Reduction, composed of the members of the House and Senate
Budget Committees."" The joint committee is to receive the OMB and
the CBO reports,1 6 7 whereas under the automatic trigger mechanism
68
the GAO would have received the reports.' The House and Senate
Budget Committees' Chairpersons become co-chairpersons and must issue a joint resolution which sets forth the data contained in the joint
OMB-CBO report.'6 9 The Committee then has five days to report the
joint resolution to the House and Senate.' After the joint resolution is
7
enacted, Congress must submit the resolution to the President.' This
resolution is deemed to have the same effect as the report submitted to
251..17.2
the President by the Comptroller General under section
Interestingly, the fallback provision permits only two hours of debate in each house. 7 Practically speaking, the two-hour limitation prevents any major modification of the Directors' reports as they appear in
the joint resolution. In addition, the legislative rules and procedures are
severely limited. For example, a vote on final passage of the resolution
must be reached within five days.' 74 Motions to consider other business,
motions to limit debate, motions to table or recommit, and amendments' 75 have all been legislated "not in order" for purposes of the
176
Act.

the District of Columbia invalidated section 252 of the Act; however, the decision was stayed
pending appeal to the Supreme Court. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1404.
164. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 274(0(1), 2 U.S.C. §
922(0() (Supp. I1 1985).
165. 131 CONG. REc. HI 1,875, HI 1,877 (daily ed. Dec. II, 1985). The fallback provision is
the sponsors' "plan C." If "plan A," the traditional budget process fails then invoke "plan B," the
automatic trigger mechanism. If "plan B" is rendered unconstitutional, invoke "plan C," the
fallback provision. The fallback provision eliminates the executive role of the GAO in the GrammRudman-Hollings Act, and returns the process to Congress. Id. § 274(0(2), 2 U.S.C. § 922(0(2).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 252, 2 U.S.C. § 902.
169. Id. § 274(0(2), 2 U.S.C. § 922(0(2).
170. Id. § 274(0(3), 2 U.S.C. § 922(0(3).
171. Id. § 274(f)(5), 2 U.S.C. § 922(0(5).
172. Id. Section 274(f)(5) of the Act eliminates the role of the Comptroller General by
substituting a legislatively created report (the resolution) in its place. Id. This section also seems
to anticipate constitutional separation of power and administrative delegation of power problems
since the provision affects only the Comptroller General's role.
173. Id. § 274()(4), 2 U.S.C. § 922(f)(4).
174. Id. § 254(a)(4)(A), 2 U.S.C. § 904(a)(4)(A).
175. Id. § 254(a)(4)(B)(ii), 2 U.S.C. § 904(a)(4)(B)(ii).
176. Id. § 254(a)(4)(D), 2 U.S.C. § 904(a)(4)(D).
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The effectiveness of the fallback provision depends on the cooperation of Congress. First, if congressional intent to balance the budget
overrides individual representatives' desires to protect particular programs, the budget cuts, as calculated by the OMB and the CBO and as
converted into the form of a resolution, will be passed by both houses.
The President will then find it difficult to veto a resolution which he has
already signed and which Congress has passed twice-first as H.R.J.
Res. 372 and second as the joint resolution. This scenario produces a
result which would have been achieved under the automatic trigger
mechanism. That is, Congress, theoretically, cannot and will not
change the resolution in only two hours, and it is highly unlikely that
the President will veto it. Thus, in terms of deficit reduction, the
fallback provision would be a success.177
A second and more likely scenario is that Congress will attempt to
amend the legislation to favor their constituencies and to delay the resolution until an agreement cannot be reached. In this situation, nothing
will be accomplished, and Congress will have failed to meet the maximum deficit amount. This scenario demonstrates that although the
fallback provision may appear to solve the GAO's separation of powers
problem, it actually results in allowing Congress to return budgetary
problems back to where they began. Coupled with the severely restricted legislative rules and procedures, it seems unlikely that any progress will be made. What then happens to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act? Most likely the Act will be recorded in history as just
another of Congress' failed attempts to balance the budget, and thus
share page space with many other discarded budget balancing laws.178
If the Act is carried out as conceived, however, the effects will be
far reaching. The Act itself is highly mechanical and requires that the
calculations be computed by experts who possess a thorough knowledge
of the budget process and accounting procedures.17 9 These calculations
will have an enormous impact on the country as a whole; few, if any,
will be free from the effects of the spending cuts.

177. Because the United States Supreme Court invalidated the automatic trigger mechanism, the Court gave Congress 60 days to implement the fallback provision and to reaffirm the
March I, 1986, budget cuts. Bowsher, 106A S. Ct. at 3194. Congress did in fact reaffirm the
budget cuts by a vote of 339-72 in the House, 132 CONG. REc. H4582 (daily ed. July 17, 1986),
and by a voice vote in the Senate. 132 CONG. REC. S9284 (daily ed. July 17, 1986). Thus far, the
fallback provision may be considered a success. See Congress Reaffirms Gramm-Rudman Cuts,
Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 18, 1986, at 14A, col. 1.
178. See supra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
179. "[Tlhe economic calculation standards, which might seem vague and confusing to laymen, will have more precise meaning to officials accustomed to making such determinations."
Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1389.
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The Impact of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act

Most commentators agree that the impact of the new budget balancing law will be unprecedented. 180 Yet, they are uncertain as to the
exact impact of the Act. 181 Compared with the spending cuts for fiscal
years 1987 through 1990, the 1986 cuts were mild. 82 It is uncertain
how and where the budget cuts will be taken, and thus it is difficult to
predict which programs will be affected. The deficit, however, must be
reduced to the specified maximum deficit amount.1 83 Whether the deficit is reduced through the traditional budgetary process, the automatic
spending cut mechanism, or the fallback provision, the cuts will have a
great impact.
The fiscal year 1986 budget cuts were achieved through the automatic across-the-board budget cut mechanism.1 84 The GAO certified
that non-defense spending must be reduced by 4.3% and defense spending by 4.9%.185 These cuts were instituted on March 1, 1986, and affected many programs. 186 For example, many farm programs and other
services under the Department of Agriculture (USDA) were cut by
$1.26 billion. 187 The amount that farmers can borrow from the USDA

180. In regard to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget cuts, Geoffrey Perselay, the acting
Human Service Commissioner of New Jersey, said: "[There is a possibility for a lot of people to
" Panel to Assess Gramm-Rudman Impact, North Jersey Advance, Mar. 10, 1986, at
suffer ....
4B, col. 1. "Literally thousands of individual programs will be affected." Saikowski, US Deficit
Means Many Cuts, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
181. Walsh & Hildreth, Washington Faces Year of Showdowns Without End, U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., Jan. 6, 1986, at 26. One estimate places program cuts between 17% and 25%.
Levin, The Nation's No. I Priority, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1986, at 21, col. 2.
182. Hoffman, First Wave of Automatic Budget Cutbacks To Be Felt Widely, Wash. Post,
Jan. 14, 1986, at AI, col. I. The fiscal year 1986 budget cuts went into effect on March I, 1986.
Id. The automatic spending cut provision eliminated $11.7 billion from the budget. Id. Compared
to the $36 billion that must be cut from each consecutive budget until fiscal year 1991, the fiscal
year 1986 cuts appear insignificant.
183. See supra note 8.
184. Gramm-Rudman Begins the Big Slash, Dayton Daily News, Jan. 16, 1986, at 20, col.
I [hereinafter Big Slash].
185. Palmer, GAO Certifies that Deficit Law Calls for 4.3-Pct. Reductions, Chron. Higher
Educ., Jan. 29, 1986, at 14, col. 4.
186. Blustein, U.S. Agencies Are Told to Cut Outlays by 4.3%, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1986,
at 3, col. 1. Programs that received cuts in fiscal year 1986 are: Defense (military), $5.1 billion;
Defense (civilian), $497 million; Agriculture, $1.3 billion; Health and Human Services, $1 billion;
Office of Personnel Management,- $596.9 million; Transportation, $373.6 million; Energy, $333.7
million; Funds administered by the President, $268.8 million; NASA, $223.2 million; Interior,
$202.1 million; Veterans Administration, $196.5 million; Labor, $171.6 million; Education, $171
million; Justice, $143.1 million; Legislative Branch, 62.1 million; State, $99.6 million; Commerce,
$68.2 million; Judiciary, $37.7 million; Small Business Administration, $37.2 million; Housing
and Urban Development, 32.7 million; General Services Administration, 15.2 million; Executive
Office of the President, $4.1 million; Environmental Protection Agency, $1.1 million; and other
various independent agencies, $344 million. Big Slash, supra note 184, at 20.
187. Saikowski, supra note 180.
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was reduced.' 8 8 The USDA was also forced to achieve cutbacks
through layoffs and shortened hours for its employees."8 9 Education has
also received many budget cuts. Student aid was cut by $209 million, 90
adult literacy programs by $4.3 million, vocational education by $33.6
million, Chapter 1 (a program that targets the special education needs
of disadvantaged youths) by $158 million, and bilingual education by
$7.2 million. 191 In addition, Medicare, the National Security Council,
the White House Office, the Agency for International Development, 19 2
and the National Institute of Health193 all suffered major budget cuts.
The only program that has been partially protected is the defense
budget. The President was given limited latitude to determine the way
in which cuts were apportioned among the various defense programs
only for fiscal year 1986.9"
The spending cuts which lie ahead, however, will have the most
impact. These cuts will come out of many popular programs that have
enjoyed generous budgets in the past. The fiscal year 1987 budget has
already been submitted to Congress by the President, and some of the
cuts are immense. 98 For example, the budget proposes to eliminate the
revenue-sharing program and to increase the amount borrowers pay for
mortgage insurance on Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
loans. 1 96
Ironically, many of President Reagan's proposed budget cuts for
fiscal year 1987 are cuts which the President submitted in the past but
were rejected by Congress. 9" Faced with the possibility of across-theboard cuts, both Congress and the President will be under much pressure to compromise. 9 8 A compromise that selectively cuts the deficit is
preferred over the indiscriminate budget cuts which would result from
the fallback provision.

188. Budget Law to Cut Farm Programs, N.J. Herald, Jan. 17, 1986, at B5, col. 3.
189. Id.
190. Palmer, supra note 185.
191. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, Act I, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 1986, at D5, col. 1.
192. Saikowski, supra note 180.
193. Hoffman, supra note 182.
194. Blustein, supra note 186, at 16, col. 1.
195. A Little Life in That Dead Budget, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1986, at 22EY, col. 1.
196. Doan, The Battle of the Axmen, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 13, 1986, at 16.
Eliminating the revenue sharing program would save $4.6 billion, and increasing the amount borrowers pay for mortgage insurance on FHA loans from 3.8% to 5% of the mortgage would curtail
lending. Id.
197. Dewar, Reagan Budget Declared Dead Before Arrival, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1986, at
AS, col. I.
198. Id. See also Rogers, House Vote on Senate's $18.4 Billion Bill to Cut Deficit to Hinge
on Regional Issues, Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 1986, at 7, col. I ("As Congress begins to focus on the
fiscal 1987 budget, there is increasing pressure to take any compromise that will bring the government closer to the deficit targets of the Gramm-Rudman budget law.").
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The impact of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act differs depending on which economic philosophy one follows. According to the majority of economists, the deficit has been the basal cause of high interest
rates, the strong dollar, insufficient business investment, and therefore,
the primary cause of deteriorating domestic and foreign markets. 99 In
other words, the "deficit has crowded out the most dynamic and productive sectors of the U.S. economy"2 0 0 and "reduced the overall
growth rate. ' 20 1 These economists predict that "lower government
spending or higher taxes, or both, will reduce interest rates and will
probably-but not certainly-lower the dollar."2 ' In addition, these
economists predict a revival in private sector growth. 0 3 They believe
that, in the past, the deficit has absorbed the private savings needed to
04
make the private sector investments grow.
On the other hand, some economists are not so optimistic. 20 5 This
camp of economists predicts that the "sharp cuts in the deficit-and
the fiscal stimulus it provides-could depress the economy. 20°6 Some
monetary authorities who hold this view urge that a more expansive
monetary policy is needed.2 0 7 They assert that an expansive monetary
policy will "'accommodate' the cuts," while a more restrictive policy
could throw the economy into a recession even sooner than predicted. 0 8
The impact of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act will also be felt
outside the United States. The State Department plans to close at least
seven consulates in foreign nations.2 9 In addition, foreign economic
been cut and are scheduled to receive
and military aid have already
210
future.
the
in
cuts
more

199.

Bernstein, The Gramm-Rudman Economy, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1986, at 32, col. 3.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (Lower government spending or higher taxes should spur business investment and it
should also reduce the trade imbalance.).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Bacon, The Economic Impact of Gramm-Rudman, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1986, at 5,
col. 5.
206. Id.
207. Sinai, It's Time to Loosen the Money Strings, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1986, at 2F, col. 3.
"The potential drag on the economy of so much budget tightening is a new factor that must be
accounted for in monetary policy. In principle, the Fed can offset fiscal restraint with easier
money to maintain a desired pace of economic growth." Id.
208. Makin, The Perils of a Switch in Fed Policy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1986, at 2F, col. 3.
209. Oberdorfer, Budget Cuts May Close at Least 7 Consulates, Wash. Post, March 11,
1986, at A17, col. 1. Although the Act permits closing consulates, it clearly prohibits closing
military bases. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, § 252(a)(2)(C)(ii),
2 U.S.C. § 902(a)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. I11 1985).
210. Gramm-Rudman Deficit Impact May Be Felt Far from U.S., Wall St. J., Jan. 27,
1986, at 28, col. 5.
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Changes in the United States economy resulting from the GrammRudman-Hollings Act will also affect the economies of foreign nations.
A lower deficit in the United States could trigger lower interest rates
around the world, 21' decrease the value of the dollar, and increase
United States exports.2 1 2 United States interest rates have already
fallen in anticipation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget cuts and
are expected to fall even further."
Increased demand for United
States goods in Europe and Japan, 211 resulting from a lower dollar exchange rate, would in turn help to reduce the United States trade deficit. 21 5 Furthermore, debt servicing costs in Latin America and East
Asia would also decrease.2 6
Various other effects on the country have also been predicted. One
possible consequence of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act is an eventual increase in taxes. 17 Believing that spending cuts alone cannot
solve the deficit problem, 1 6 analysts have argued that tax increases will
be necessary both to further reduce the deficit and to soften the
threatened deep cuts in many popular programs.21 9
Selling or transferring certain functions which are now performed
in the public sector to the private sector has also been suggested as a
way to reduce spending. 2 James C. Miller, President Reagan's Budget
Director, has proposed abolishing the Interstate Commerce Commission and selling many of the nation's assets to meet the fiscal year 1987
maximum deficit amount. 2 ' This transfer process, termed "privatization," can potentially cut spending without the loss of programs. 2 2
Privatization allows the federal government to effect major reductions
in the deficit because sales of assets realize large amounts of money
quickly. 22 3 Targets of other proposed sales include outstanding student

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. This could help stimulate these countries' economies.
217. Sheler, One Giant Step for Washington, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1985, at
18-19, col. 1; but see Inquiry, U.S.A. Today, Jan. 21, 1986, at 9A, col. I (Senate Majority
Leader, Robert Dole, stated "I'm not going to stand up and suggest that we need revenues.").
218. Inquiry, supra note 217. See 131 CONG. REC. S16,983-84 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985)
(Sen. Biden stated, "[T]here can be little doubt that serious deficit reduction will require . . .
increases in revenues.").
219. See generally Sheler, supra note 217.
220. Butler, Why It Pays to Privatize PublicServices, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, § 3, at 2,
col. 3.
221. Pear, The New Hand at the Budget Office Is Even More Tightfisted, N.Y. Times, Jan.
5, 1986, at E5, col. 1.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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loans, FHA housing loans, and FHA rehabilitation loans.
Beyond fiscal year 1987, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, unless repealed, will affect even more programs. The defense budget,
which must absorb one-half of the spending cuts, will feel the impact of
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act acutely. It is predicted that the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act "will dramatically reverse President
Reagan's military buildup and lead to 'the greatest defense cutback in
peacetime history.' "225 In addition, experts predict that the spending
cuts will slow weapon production and therefore increase the price of
each weapon. 226 This spending reduction will force the Department of
Defense to take a closer look at current weapons systems and "evaluate
their cost and their contribution to the national security. ' 22 7 Defense
Secretary Weinberger fears that a reduced military budget could jeopwith the Soviet Union because
ardize United States arms control talks
228
incentive to bargain will be reduced.
The list of possible consequences of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act is endless. Future spending cuts should be expected since maximum deficit amounts are now law and must be achieved. 229 However, it
remains to be seen whether Congress can balance the budget through
use of the fallback provision. Congress specifically created the Act to
avoid the friction that currently exists between the President and Congress during the budgetary process. Friction, however, is a by-product
of our system of checks and balances. Congress still must reach an
agreement with the executive branch since the fallback provision brings
the entire budgetary process back to Congress. Thus, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act will be subject to the same difficulties that existed in
the traditional budgetary process.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Whether the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, an immense, complex
piece of legislation, will successfully reduce the deficit is unknown. Also
224. Eisner, Cut Deficits, but Not by Selling Assets, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, § 3, at 2,
col. 3. Selling the Bonneville Dam has also been suggested. Id.
225. Dewar, Pentagon Could Face Record Cut, Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 1986, at Al, col. 6.
"The whole Reagan buildup from 1980 to 1985 was about $90 billion" and the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act may repeal almost half of it. Keller, Budget Aides Urge Various Cutbacks at Pentagon in '87, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1985, at I, col. I.
226. Keller, supra note 225.
227. 131 CONG. REC. S16,983-84 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement by Sen. Biden).
228. Keller, Weinberger Says Military Budget Cuts Would Imperil Arms Talks, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 10, 1986, at All, col. I.
229. This assumes that the Act is not repealed by an act of Congress. Also, the cuts will be
suspended in the event of war, Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, §
251(g), 2 U.S.C. § 901(g) (Supp. I11 1985), or in the event of recession. Id. § 254, 2 U.S.C. §
904.
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unknown is the price the American public will have to pay. Crafted
quickly and enacted in an unorthodox fashion, the Act should be
viewed with caution. The Act is an aberration rather than the legislative norm.
The United States Supreme Court has now vested Congress with
the responsibility to balance the budget through default to the fallback
provision. The process, however, will be difficult. Accountability for the
required cuts is exactly what Congress sought to avoid. No longer can
members of Congress blame faceless bureaucrats for budget cuts which
may anger their constituents. Many, including the members of Congress themselves, must certainly be thinking: The Gramm-RudmanHollings Act sounds like a great idea, but do we really want to go
through with it?
Susan Bielanowski
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